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d i s t r i b u t e for value in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) (Supp. 1985) . 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 21015 
-v- i 
RUSSELL D. CONSTANTINO, t Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Russell D. Constantino, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1985)1 (See Addendum A) (R. 13-14). After a 
preliminary hearing in the Fourth Circuit Court on August 21, 
1985 (R. 23), he was bound over to stand trial in the Second 
Judicial District Court in Davis County (R. 1 ) . In the district 
court, defendant filed a motion to suppress marijuana seized from 
the passenger compartment of the car he was driving (R. 18, 
Addendum B). After a pre-trial hearing on October 16, 1985, the 
district court denied defendant's motion (Tr. 7), finding that 
the officer had probable cause to stop the defendant for driving 
on a suspended license (Tr. 7 ) . Further, the trial court held 
^-Section 1 of this statute was amended in 1986 and substituted 
"under" for "pursuant to," "pursuant to the provisions of" and 
"in accordance with" wherever such language appeared. 
that there was evidence the officer knew the passenger and that 
there was an outstanding warrant on him (Tr. 7). 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute for value in a 
jury trial held October 16, 1985, in the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, Judge, presiding (R. 61)• Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Page on January 23, 1986, to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term of zero to five years and fined 
$1,000.00. Judge Page stayed the prison term, placed the 
defendant on probation, and suspended all but $500 of the fine 
upon successful completion of probation (R. 92-93). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 21, 1985, Bountiful Police Officers Grant 
Hodgson and David Jackman were on patrol when Officer Hodgson saw 
defendant driving (Tr. 14). Just days earlier, Hodgson learned 
through dispatch and records available to dispatch that 
defendant's driver's license was suspended (Tr. 6, 15). Hodgson 
also observed the passenger, Birdsall, for whom he had seen a 
felony arrest warrant (Tr. 5, 15). After following defendant and 
then pulling the car over, the officers confirmed through 
dispatch that defendant's license was still suspended (Tr. 15-16; 
R. 23). The officers then proceded to cite defendant for driving 
on suspension (Tr. 16). Birdsall was placed under arrest on the 
warrant (Tr. 16). The only other occupant in the car was a minor 
child (Tr. 16). Because the car did not belong to any of its 
occupants (Tr. 16-17, 26) and there was no licensed driver 
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available to take responsibility for the carr Officers Hodgson 
and Jackman impounded the car for safekeeping until a licensed 
driver or the registered owner could pick up the car (Tr. 17, 19, 
30). 
Pursuant to the impound and according to set procedure/ 
which included completing an impound record form listing the 
defects, damage and contents of the car (Tr. 17), Hodgson 
conducted an inventory search (Tr. 19). He found two plastic 
bags filled with green plant material and some garbage inside a 
paper sack (Tr. 18). Hodgson put the plastic bags in his trunk 
and delivered them to Officer Steve Grey, an evidence technician 
for Bountiful City (Tr. 18-19, 34). 
Microscopic and chemical tests indicated the green 
plant material was marijuana (Tr. 39-40). Each baggie of 
marijuana weighed 39 grams (Tr. 50). Grey also determined from 
the latent print lifted from the baggie that there were enough 
similarities to match that print with the print on defendant's 
fingerprint card (Tr. 43, 45-47). 
At trial. Officer Steve Brown testified that the 
quantity of marijuana found was more than that normally possessed 
for personal use; that it was a quantity kept to sell to others 
(Tr. 58). He further testified that the street value was 
approximately $400 to $500 in 1982-83 (Tr. 60) and had 
consistently increased from his first experience in 1977 to his 
most recent in 1983 (Tr. 60-61) . Brown based his opinion on 
eight years experience and training as a police officer (Tr. 56). 
More specifically he stated he had worked for two years, from 
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1977 to 1979, for State Narcotics and Liquor Law Enforcement 
under the Department of Public Safety (Tr. 56) and was assigned 
to the Salt Lake City Metro Narcotics Unit in 1982 and 1983 (Tr. 
57)• He participated in at least one hundred drug purchases in 
1982-83 as part of infiltration investigations in Salt Lake and 
Park City (Tr. 57). 
Officer Hodgson also testified that he had previous 
experience with more than 100 narcotics purchase investigations. 
He had worked three years as an undercover informant for the 
Davis-Morgan Narcotics Traffic Force, Weber State University 
Security and Salt Lake City Narcotics Strike Force (R. 20). He 
located people who were distributing drugs, made purchases from 
them, and then testified in court as to those purchases (Tr. 20). 
Based on his experience, Hodgson believed the plant material to 
be marijuana and the quantity to be more than one would keep for 
personal use (Tr. 20-21). 
Based upon the evidence introduced at trial the jury 
found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress since the stop was based on a reasonable suspicion that 
defendant was violating the law, i.e. driving on a suspended 
license. 
Since neither defendant nor his passengers owned the 
car defendant was driving, under State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 
(Utah 1984) , defendant does not have a legitimate expectation of 
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privacy in the car to give him standing to challenge the search 
under the Fourth Amendment or Utah Const. Art. I , S 14. 
This Court should not address de fendan t s argument tha t 
the inventory search was improper because defendant did not 
challenge the search e i ther in the motion to suppress or a t 
t r i a l . 
F i n a l l y , e x p e r t o p i n i o n t e s t i m o n y i s a d m i s s i b l e under 
Utah R. E v i d . 7 0 2 . Based on O f f i c e r H o d g s o n ' s and Brown ' s e x p e r t 
t e s t i m o n y , s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e e x i s t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y 
v e r d i c t of p o s s e s s i o n of a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e w i t h i n t e n t t o 
d i s t r i b u t e f o r v a l u e . T h e r e f o r e , t h a t v e r d i c t s h o u l d be 
s u s t a i n e d . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SINCE 
THE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS 
BASED UPON REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS VIOLATING THE LAW. 
The d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d have 
s u p p r e s s e d t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d b e c a u s e t h e o f f i c e r l a c k e d 
p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o s t o p t h e d e f e n d a n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , d e f e n d a n t 
c l a i m s a p r i n t o u t from t h e O f f i c e of D r i v e r L i c e n s e S e r v i c e s 
i n d i c a t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s l i c e n s e was n o t suspended and t h u s t h e 
o f f i c e r had no r e a s o n t o s t o p d e f e n d a n t . 
To d e t e r m i n e whe the r t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t o p of 
d e f e n d a n t was l a w f u l , t h i s Cour t must ask whe the r t h e p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r had " r e a s o n a b l e s u s p i c i o n " n o t " p r o b a b l e c a u s e " t o s t o p 
t h e v e h i c l e . Brown v . T e x a s . 443 U . S . 4 7 , 51 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; T e r r y v . 
O h i o , 392 U.S . 1 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . Utah law p r o v i d e s : 
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A peace officer may stop any person 
in a public place when he has reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
Otah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982). The reasonable suspicion 
standard applies to investigative stops of vehicles. United 
States v. Sharpe, U.S. , , 105 S. Ct. 1568 , 1573 
(1985); State v. Elliott, 626 P.2d 423 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Gibson 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (19 82) protects an 
individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures because it requires that the officer entertain a 
reasonable suspicion that the individual was, is, or is about to 
be engaged in criminal activity. Section 77-7-15 further 
protects governmental interests in that law enforcement officers 
must be able, *in appropriate circumstances, and in an 
appropriate manner Ito] approach a person for [the! purpose of 
investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no 
probable cause to make an arrest," United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 704 (1983), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
The instant case is similar to State v. Gibson, 665 
P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983). There, this Court held an officer had 
reasonable suspicion to stop a driver where the officer knew the 
defendant's driver's license had been revoked and suspected it 
was still revoked. Therefore, the fact that Officer Hodgson, 
like the officer in Gibson, knew the defendant's driver's license 
had been suspended (R. 5,6, 14-15) and suspected the license was 
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o f f i c e r indicated that the o f f i c e r had stopped defendant a few 
days prior to May 2 1 , 1985 and pursuant t o that s top had learned 
defendant's l i c e n s e was suspended (Tr. 5 ) . The o f f i c e r stopped 
defendant on May 2 1 , 1985 based upon the o f f i c e r ' s knowledge that 
defendant's l i c e n s e was suspended a few days prior t o that date . 
Because the s top of defendant was not based upon information in 
the pr intout , but upon the o f f i c e r ' s knowledge that defendant's 
l i c e n s e was recent ly suspended, and there was a felony warrant on 
the passenger in the v e h i c l e , the information in the printout was 
not material t o the s top , and the t r i a l court correct ly found the 
o f f i c e r s had reasonable suspic ion t o s top defendant. 
POINT U 
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE HE WAS 
DRIVING UNDER STATE V, VALDEZ, 689 P.2d 
1334 (UTAH 1984) . 
Defendant argues on appeal that the lower court erred 
in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence se ized from 
the v e h i c l e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , defendant a l l e g e s the evidence was 
se i zed as the r e s u l t of a "pretext11 inventory search. S ta te v. 
Hvqh, 711 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) . 
This case , on the f a c t s presented t o the t r i a l court , 
i s ind i s t ingu i shab le from Sta te v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984) . There, a unanimous Court held that the defendant, who did 
not own the car which he was driving and which was the object of 
the search complained of, lacked standing t o complain of the 
search which fol lowed a s top made by po l i ce o f f i c e r s . I t i s 
c lear from Valdez that mere possess ion of property or presence 
there in or thereon, without some showing of a l e g i t i m a t e 
- 8 -
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had no s t a n d i n g tr ompi rn P of ff i/mm I mi Hi m ,i i < \ |< \ 
c i i in I I "«< iiiiiiiwiit ill a n a u t o m o b i l e wlhi i t d e i e n d a n t h a d n o p e r s o n a l 
r i g h t s i i " P hujfc.Cp c a i , <nr e v i d e n c e s e i z e d ) , 
_ 9 _ 
While standing could possibly be found on the 
alternative ground that a defendant has standing to object to 
evidence obtained as fruit of an illegal stop, see, e.g., State 
v. Scott. 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985r 987 (1982), appeal after 
remand, 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188, review denied, 685 P.2d 
998 (1984) (passenger in vehicle had standing to object to 
evidence as fruit of an illegal stop, even though he may not have 
had a recognizable expectation of privacy in the vehicle itself); 
People v. Flowers, 111 111. App. 3d 348, 67 111. Dec. 203, 444 
N.E.2d 242, 246 (1982) (driver who did not own vehicle and had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in it could nevertheless 
challenge the evidence seized on the ground that the stop of the 
vehicle was illegal) , in Point I, supra, the State demonstrates 
that the stop was proper based on the officer's reasonable 
suspicion that defendant was driving on a suspended license. 
The defendant has the burden to prove his Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or 
seizure. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). Because 
defendant fails to prove, or even claim that he had an actual, 
subjective expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched, or 
that his expectation of privacy in the vehicle was legitimate 
(Tr. 3-6), the defendant clearly lacks standing to contest the 
search of the vehicle. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO 
CHALLENGE THE SEARCH, BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE 
SEARCH IN THE TRIAL COURT, THIS 
COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THIS 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
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Assuming t h a t defendant has s tand ing t o cl la i lenge the 
search of the vehii I i h i s argument t ha t a p r e t e x t u a l inventory 
i i»d i ch inn i on i i» I hlh mi I I ill i I I i in lli 11 as sr-11 in in in | i|n all 
II 1a well es tabl i shed! thai wlim e ii defendant f a i l s t o 
n M ml fi p a r t i c u l a r qronnri 1 <ir hiif »)n as si nq unlawfully ml I ained 
I I i II i l l ' I I I ( J III I I I II II I I III III III III III I I I I II II III I I I II I I I I I I III In III III III III II I i l l I f i l l > II i l l I t i l r i l l 
qround on appeal l ill e v . Carti i Ml/ I1 2d 656 (Utah 1985)? 
S t a t e i , i c e , 633 P.2d 4B (Utah 1981). " iTlhe f a i l u r e t n n ^ e r t 
a p a r t i c u l a r ground in a p r e - l i i a l suppress i i in iiinljnn n|< id 
i idiaiver of tha riyhl to i hiallenge the subsequent admission of 
evidence* MINI I 11 ill jround, " Cai t e i
 t /LI1 III1, "ill ill Mill c i t i n g United 
S t a t e s v . Schwartz , S Vi K 2d IfiO, at ll»l I/ml ( i i , )9?(i1, 
Defendant never objected In the l e g a l i t y of tint1 
in II i ml i in y l i JII rll in i mi I lii mi in I I In i I in I I  in i 11l ' mi in pf 11 H • ' i n n In i MI i i n | i >r 
d u r i n g t In> t r j M l . l i , t d J , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l s t a t e d , . mM) e n t i i e 
b a s i s h » f t h e m o t i u n t o s u p p r e s s ) q o e s t o t h e i a c t i h u l W i l l i 
III III1 I I I II " I 1 11 | II l i t II t I III II PHI i M M I 11 l J C d l i S F I n ,( I II I III II III II I II II , I I I 
v a l i d s top and a r r e s t , am i,>a]id i oason t o s top the car" (Tr . " 
I I , Because defendant never a s s e r t e d an improper p r e t e x t u a l 
i IIi i " i j r11 <>i y s e a r c h as., a g i oni11 i i 111 '11m|»j iress ioi it i n I Im, 1 i > i
 r 
the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on this 
issue, 11 11! , f hi s Court F,hou 1 d nut isider 
C a r t e r Hit / |»„ Jd at M i l l I  I wmi II ill » 
S t a t e to defend the m e r i t s of these argument. ^ r.aJ no 
i p rese rve p e r t i n e n t fac* .,- ^v uiet>c i ^ u e s in t h e 
recor* 
There i s nothing in the record t o 
ind ica te that the point now urged 
upon t h i s Court was unavailable or 
unknown to defendant at the time 
he f i l e d h i s motion t o suppress f 
and t o en ter ta in the point now 
would be to sanct ion the pract ice 
of withholding p o s i t i o n s that 
should properly be presented t o 
the t r i a l court but which may be 
withheld for the purpose of seeking 
reversal on appeal and a new t r i a l 
or d i s m i s s a l . 
Lee, 633 P.2d at 53* If defendant had presented these i s s u e s t o 
the t r i a l court, the State could have introduced evidence t o 
refute those cha l l enges . To ask the Sta te to second-guess 
defendant by refut ing and supporting arguments not made would put 
an undue burden on the prosecution and thwart the purpose of the 
advocacy system. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT FINDING 
THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF POSSESSION OF 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
Defendant contends Officer Brown's testimony as t o 
in tent to d i s t r i b u t e lacked proper foundation (Tr. 57, 67-68; 
D.B. 6-7) , and thus insuff icient evidence existed to convict 
defendant of possession with intent to distr ibute . 
This Court must view the evidence in the l ight most 
favorable to the jury verdict . A jury verdict i s reversed only 
when the evidence i s suff ic ient ly inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
-12-
II wi-v. r u n * » i f ! H 1! l^taU- v . Booker » II I V Ml 14 » • J41 ( Ml >ih 
19 8 5 ) , c i t i n g S t a t e v. P e t r e e , 6 5 9 Jf"". 2 nil <1 J ! , 14 1 "I111 a I J 19 b .11 ; 
accord , S t a t e v . McCardell , 652 P. 2d 94 2 I I'"» 11982). ' Il I i s t h e 
i « i n Ill mi, i n « i i \ i ; ' f , in JI 11 t 1 in i f 1 1 I III ) HI i mi I w ii • i 11! I III i ' i > ' i de n c e i\ i n Jil I i» 
determine the c r e d i b i l i t y oi Liir wi tnesses S t a t e v, 
Lamm, b06 P.2d 229, 23 1 (Utah 1980); accord . S t a t e v. Linden. 657 
I"", i11111 II I I, , II I 1 1111 all Il " I Ml 3 ) . 
Utah R. Evid. 7 02 provides: 
If scientific, technica 1
 r oi: other 
specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, ski 1 1 , 
experiencef training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise, 
i», in I 1 i f i l l i t i n n i l l 1 | N « I i II ill f i l l f h | M H ta ill l i e f ' l i m i t in i i l i i i h k . 
Ev i d . "' 11J i b i mi i II 11 (i i i i s c r e 11 o 11 ml. f l u t i 111 II i t) u i i . I  11 e v« 
Espi n o z a , U t a h , No, 2021 2
 r s i i j ut», a t 4! H A u q u s t 4 , 1 9 8 6 ) , c i t i n g 
S t a t e \J. L o c k e , I 1111 II Il 1 II 1 11 II • 1II1 1 9 8 4 ) . II1 ' I 1 1 n 111 II 
Espinoza* t h i s Court found no abuse \d d i s c r e t i o n in line c o u i t ' s 
flllowinq an of f ice r tn l e s t i f y as an expert rilhifit",, tlie o f f i ce r 
I 1.1 I • 1 , j i« - M ! 1 I - . 1 1  « 1 I * . 
In becoming a po l i ce o f f ice i iiiui had worked tor s eve ra l yea r s as 
a 11 i nv e s t i ga tor . 
D e t o n ( j d 111 iji .1 II I 1) 1. > * II II in 1  mi 1  in in II y m '" 1 1 J i . * 1 1 1 , 1 Il 11 i I 1 * 11 II II 
d i s t r i b u t e war- the test imony ot Otf icei Brown, hnwev vt, Officer 
Hodqson ii I - I n o t i f i e d ar. t . I I f.l 1 !.f of defendar.1 f 
d i s t r i b u t e for va lue , O l t i c e i Hodgson t e s t i l ied I ha I I mi' served 
f01 t h r e e years as a paid informa t . oca t i ng i n d i v i d u a l s who v 
d 1 « I mi in II I  II n u l l 1I1 in I "Ii11, ', I) 1 1 1 r 
t e s t i f i e d the quantity recovered from the v e h i c l e would appear to 
be more than an individual would have in h i s possess ion a t any 
one time for personal use (R. 21) . 
Officer Brown t e s t i f i e d that he worked for Narcot ics 
and Liquor Law Enforcement from 1977 through 1979 and Metro 
Narcot ics from 1982 to 1983 (R. 56-57) . During t h i s time he 
i n f i l t r a t e d groups of people that were s e l l i n g drugs and was 
involved in over 100 s i t u a t i o n s which dea l t with marijuana (R. 
57) . He further s tated the amount of marijuana found in 
d e f e n d a n t s v e h i c l e was too large for personal consumption (R. 
58) . 
Proper foundation was l a i d for both expert w i t n e s s e s . 
This testimony and the large quantity of marijuana se ized from 
the v e h i c l e provided the jury with an adequate bas i s t o find an 
in tent to d i s t r i b u t e for va lue . In reviewing the evidence in the 
l i g h t most favorable to the jury verd ic t f and keeping in mind 
that , in a jury t r i a l f i t i s the j u r y ' s e x c l u s i v e function to 
weigh the evidence and determine the wi tnesses 1 c r e d i b i l i t y , 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom e x i s t e d 
from which the element of intent could be found. 
CONCLUSION 
The o f f i c e r ' s s top of defendant was based upon 
reasonable suspic ion and thus , the t r i a l court properly admitted 
the evidence se ized as a r e s u l t of the s top . Furthermore, 
because defendant did not own the v e h i c l e he was driving and 
because the stop of that v e h i c l e was lawful , he lacks standing to 
chal lenge the search of the v e h i c l e . Even i f i t were assumed 
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t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s t a n d i ) " , ' i" ' i <->i' M * m l i . he t a i l e d t o 
c h a l l e n g e tin1 l e g a l i t y ">f* the soarc l i in th*1 f i i d l c o u i t on t-he 
in » ii i m i n i 1 mi i e s p n t o r l i n r i p j * ' ? * ! , T h e r e f o i c% t h i n C o u i t s h o u l d 
in»ii 11 c o n s i d e r L h i L Ami on I i i Il il , i nil I 11 n iiiiii i 1  m i i i i <* n t imninn, » b y 
I wuii w i t n e s s e s was iiiliiiitted t o s uppo r t I he IIIIII v e rd i c t of 
(KISW" * iiiiii k I 1 In Iiiiii i ni I II d i s t r i b u t e f \ i i lm , A c c o r d i n g l y , 
t h i s Cour t shou ld a f f i r m def enaaii i n i in i i i i in i i i M i n in »! 
Utah Code Ann <i 58-3? • HI i I i d i i i i i (Supp. l^BSj , 
Rei pn< t ] in i in mi in in I i in i n i s j j . ria) ol August
 r 1 9 8 6 . 
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V 
ADDENDUM A 
58-374. Prohibited acta—Penalties.—(1) Prohibited acta A—Penal-
ties: 
(a) Except at authorized by this act, it ahall be unlawful for any 
person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) To produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance ; 
(ii) To distribute for value or possess with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) To possess a controlled substance enumerated in section 58-
37-4 in the course of his business as a sales representative of a manu-
facturer or distributor of substances enumerated in schedules II through 
V of section 58-37-4 except pursuant to an order or prescrition; 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value or to negotiate to have a controlled sub-
stance distributed or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, or 
negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific controlled substance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
ADDENDUM B 
12 E*»t fourth South - «3J0 
**lt L*ko City* Utah 14111 
Telephone IBOlJ 3C4-6474 
!Pi r i up "• »*PWP 
fit-
in THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RUSSELL D. CONSTANTINO, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE 
Case No. 5024 
Defendant moves the court to set a hearing for suppres-
sion of evidence/ to wit/ all evidence seized from the vehicle 
at the time of the arrest of defendant Constantino. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the officer 
stopped the vehicle on the pretext that he was driving on a 
suspended license, however, the records of the Department of 
Public Safety indicate that defendant Constantino's license was 
not on suspension at that time. 
WHEREFORE/ counsel moves the court for an evidentiary 
hearing on suppression and, thereafter, to suppress all evidence 
seized in the search of the vehicle. 
DATED this 26th day of September/ 1985. 
Ujctte34A/-L 
SUMNER ^ .^4ATCH 
Attorney for Defendant Constantino 
FlcV^D 
